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Developing nations should adopt less sophisticated taxes (such
as taxes on goods and services) to broaden the tax base, and use
more efficient administrative technique (such as withholdings
and computerization). At present, potential tax bases are often
not exploited because the application of existing law (particu-
larly for income taxes) is not possible.
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In many devnloping nations, tax administrators  criminates against the most accessible target:
often make their own policy because they are  the modem sector of the economy, which is
unable to enforce the laws.  crucial to growth and development.
Administrators face major problems:  A  Governments should shift away from trade
large portion of the economy is at a subsistence  taxes to consumption taxes, such as sales tax,
level and does not keep records.  Where records  particularly of the valuc added variety. They
are kept, accounting is not reliable.  Axpayer  should also move toward more broadly based
cooperation is also low for a variety of reasons:  income taxes (including interest and dividends
shortage of trained officials, a tradition of  - not just wages), with realistic rates.  Assess-
corruption, and because taxes are not often seen  ment based on "presumptive" rather than actual
to produce better govemment services.  calculation methods can also help extend the tax
base to the self-employed, to subsistence farn-
These problems induce governments to rely  ers, to traders, and to smaller firms.
heavily on trade taxes.  But this is costly.
Export taxes tie revenue to unpredictable export  The single most effective way to improve
commodity prices which aggravates fiscal  tax administration is to use a system of income
stabilization problems.  Import duties lead to  withholdings (for aU  components of income).
excessive protection of inefficient domestic  Another important tool is computerization. This
industry.  can simplify withholding and collection by
giving each taxpayer a number in a master file.
Acministrative problems also lead to the  Computers also facilitate information gathering,
selecdve collection of income tax. This dis-  cross checking. and audits.
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I.  Introduction
Discussion  of tax  administration  in  developing  countries  should
begin  with  one  central  idea--the  inseparability  of tax  administration
and tax  policy. In industrial  countries  tax  administration  is  concerned
with  assessment,  collection  and  enforcement  of legislation  that  forms
the  content  of tax  policy. In these  countries  tax  administration  by and
large  'carries  out  the  orders'  of tax  policy,  and  tax  administrators
need  only  be conceraed  with  how  well  existing  legislation  is  being
implemented.  In  developing  countries  we find  a completely  different
story,  although  we  must  bear in  mind  that  developing  countries
themselves  run  the  gamut  from  sophisticated  to  rudimentary  tax
administrations.  In  the  typical  low  income  LDC  the  income  tax  and
other  legislation  of a typical  developing  country  may  be quite  similarto  European  or North  American  models,  but  the  administrative  apparatus
to implement  the  complicated  legislation  is lacking. Faced  with  this
task,  tax  administrators  in developing  couatr!  a generally  adopt
simpleand  selective  methods  :o  raise  revenue. The "effective"  tax
system  then  bears  little  resemblance  to the  system  embodied  in the
legislation.  In  more  advanced  developing  countries  the  gai  between  the
legislative  and  real  systems  becomes  much  narrower;  in East  Asia,  Chile,
Uruguay,  Kenya,  and Senegal  tax  administrators  more  nearly  resemble
their  counterparts  in industrial  countries. Despite  these  exceptions,
in the  bulk  of  developing  countries  it Is still  true  that  tax
adainistrators  paid  themselves  making  tax  policy  as  they  decide  how to
interpret  over-complicated  legislation.  Given  this  fact,  Gar  paper  goes
beyond  the  traditional  confines  of tax  administration  and asks  first  how
tax  administration  has shaped  tax  structure  in developing  countries,  and
what  have  been  the  consequences  of its  predominant  role.  The  second
part  of the  paper  deals  with  questions  more  traditionally  associated
with tax  administration.  In that  part  we ask  what  are the  special
problems  of tax  administration  in the  LDC  environment,  and  what tools
can  be used  to  overcome  them.-3-
II.  The  Problem: Administrative  Constraints  Lead  to
Faulty  Tax  Structure
A number  of writers  have  explored  the  connection  between  tax
administration  and  tax  structure--by  tax  structure  we mean  the  set  of
taxes  making  up total  tax  revenue. In stmmary,  they  argue  that  low  and
middle  income  countries  are  constrained  in their  choice  of taxes  by the
difficulties  of administrazion.  In  particular,  developing  coun  are
forced  to  rely  on foreign  trade  and  excise  taxes  because  these  'tar
handles"  offer  a base  on  which  taxes  can  easily  be  collected.
The  Insight  that  administrative  constraints  in  part  determine  the  tax
structure  of developing  countries  appears  accurate,  if  we examine  the
actual  tax  structure  of  developing  countries  among  themselves  and in
contrast  to industrial  countries.  For  developing  countries  a detailed
examination  of tax  structure  has  been  undertaken  by Tanzi,  using  a pool
of  82 countries  divided  by strata  of per  capita  income.  1/  For these
countries,  import  duties--based  on a  very  convenient  tax  handle--account
for  32 percent  of total  tax  revenue. The  personal  income  tax--a  much
more  difficult  tax  to  collect--accounts  for  only  9 percent  of tax
revenue. In  contrast,  for  the  most wealthy  developing  countries  the
share  of import  duties  drops  to  only 18  percent  of tax  revenue.
1/  See  Tanzi,  Vito,  "Quantitative  Characteristics  of the  Tax  Systms
of Developing  Countries,"  in  Modern  Tax  Theory  for  Developing  Countries,
edited  by D.  Newbery  and  N. Stein  (Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,
1987).-4-
For the  same  group  of higher  income  countries  the  share  of the  personal
income  tax  rises  to 13  percent,  indicating  a greater  use  of this
difficult-to-collect  tax. When developing  countries  as a whole  are
compared  with  industrial  countries,  the importance  of adtlanistrative
constraints  in  determining  the  tax  structure  Is  again  demonstrated.
For  the  average  developing  country  foreign  trade  taxes  are the  leading
tax  sources,  representing  at least  one-third  of total  tax  revenue,  while
the  yield  of foreign  trade  taxes  in  industrialized  countries  is
virtually  negligible.
Why should  developing  countries  be concerned  that  their  tax
structures  have  been  shaped  by administrative  constraints  rather  than
economic  principles?  1/  Reliance  on easy to  administer  taxes  is  costly
for  developing  countries  for  several  reasons. From  a stabilization
point  of view,  a tax  system  should  be composed  of one  or at most  several
predominant  taxes  with  a  rate  schedule  that  can  be  adjusted  quickly  and
with  a high  degree  of  certainty  to  alter  the  amount  of purchasing  power
available  to  the  private  sector. From  an efficiency  point  of view,  a
good tax  system  is  one  that  leads  to the  least  distortion  of relative
prices,  both  the  prices  facing  the  consumer  and those  facing  the  pro-
ducer.  In  some  developing  countries  many  different  import  and  excise
tax  rates  on narrow  bases  are  comb'ned  with  a variety  of exemptions  to
produce  almost  random  effects  on consumer  choice  and  producer  incen-
tives;  in  a number  of others,  especially  the  East  Asian  group,  more
1/  See  Mansfield,  Charles,  "Tax  Administration  in  Developing
Countries:  an  Economic  Perspective,'  DMF  Staff  Papers,  March  1987.-5-
rational  tariff  systems  have  been  implemented.  For  the  former  group
heavy  reliance  on foreign  trade  taxes  can  be singled  out  as the  most
undesirable  aspect  of developing  country  tax  systems  from  the  point  of
view  of  both  stabilization  and resource  allocation. From  a stabiliz-
atiot.  point  of  view  foreign  trade  taxes  tend  to  tie  government  revenue
to  unpredictable  fluctuations  of export  commodity  prices  and so  aggra-
vate fiscal  stabilization  problems. A  vicious  circle  can  also  begin  if
a reduction  in import  duties  imposed  for  demand  management  purposes
leads  to  a fall  In import  duties,  thereby  enlarging  the  fiscal  deficit.
From  a resource  allocation  (efficiency)  point  of view,  trade  taxes
have  no  place  in  a  'firat-best'  tax  structure. The  discriminatory
nature  of trade  taxes  ensures  that  their  use imposes  both  a production
distortion  cost  and  a consumption  distortion  cost.  Import  duties,  often
relied  upon  for  revenue,  may lead  to  excessive  effective  p.otection  and
encourage  inefficient  domestic  industry. Equity  goals  are  also  heavily
compromised  by the  tax  structure  of  developing  countries. To an out-
sider  this  tax  structure  may  appear  to be  highly  progressive  because  the
rate  structure  of the  personal  income  tax  is  often  highly  progressive.
On closer  examination,  however,  the  vertical  equity  of the  system  is
compromised  by the  fact  that  the  personal  income  tax  collects  a
relatively  small  share  of total  revenue  and  applies  mainly  to  wage
earners,  whose  incomes  may  be lower  than  the  self-employed.  Thus  an
apparent  vertical  equity  in rate  structure  of personal  income  tax  and-6-
import  duties  Is  negated  by a combination  of selective  administration
and legal exemptions.  With regard to  ,  zontal  equity--the principle
that  those  with equal  incomes  pay  equal .axes--the  tax  structure  of the
typical  developing  country  Is perhaps  more  clearly  inadequate. On  a
broader  basis  one  can say  that  selective  administration  of the  statutory
tax  system  discriminates  against  the  modern  sector  of the  economy.
The  modern  sector  tends  to fall  into  the  income  tax  net  because  it  keeps
better  accounts,  is more  centralized,  and thus  more revenue  productive
from  the  point  of view  of the  tax  collector. Although  a  heavier  burden
of taxation  on the  modern  sector  may  be appealing  on equity  grounds,
one should  bear  In mind that  the  present  tax  syste  tends  to  iopede  the
growth  of  the  dynamic  sector  that  may be  the  key  to  more  rapid  long-term
growth.-7-
III. Obstacles  to  Effective  Tax  Administration
Giv-n  the  fact  that  tax  a ructu-e  is  flawed  in  developLng  countries
we may  ask  what  tax  administrators  can  do about  it.  One  should  recog-
nize  at the  outset  that  tax  administration  is 'endogenous"  to  LDC
economies. One  cannot  change  tax  administration  in the  same  manner
that  one  can  change  the  exchange  rate--tax  administration  reflects  basic
social  and  economic  conditions  such  as literacy,  income  distribution  and
attitudes  toward  government  authority,  and  therefore  cannot  be changed
overnight. To  make this  point,  one  might  ask  what  would  be the  neces-
sary  conditions  to  provJde  a setting  for  effectlve  tax  administration.
One  tax  authority  has listed  tVe  requirements  for  implementation  of the
personal  income  tax  as follows,  and the  list  could  apply  to  the  imple-
mentation  of any  modern,  sophisticated  tax:  1/
a.  The  existence  of a predominantly  money  economy;
b.  A high  standard  of literacy;
c.  Prevalence  of honest  and  reliable  accounting;
d.  A large  degree  of voluntary  compliance  on the
part  of taxpayers;
e.  A political  system  not  dominated  by wealthy  groups
acting  arbitrarily  in  their  own self-interest.
1/  See  Goode,  Richard,  Government  Finance  In Developing  Countrles,
the  Brookings  Institution,  Washington,  D.C.,  1984.-8-
Developing  countriec  e degree  or  another  lack  the  above
requlrements.  A large  po:  the  economy  (e.g.,  agriculture  and
small  traders)  is either  a s  nce  (barter)  economy  or does  not  keep
accessible  records. Although  ' s not  a necessary  condition  for
taxation, the lack of a literate populat_-.  reduces the options for
policy-makers.  For  example,  simple  poll  or excise  taxes  may  have  to
be employed  instead  of income  taxes. Lack  of reliable  accounting
also  constrains  the  type  of taxes  that  can  be effectively  employed.
The  personal  and company  income  tax  depend  on good  accounting. Lack  of
voluntary  compliance  by taxpayers  undercuts  effective  administration  of
almost  every  tax  and,  as noted  above,  forces  the  aduinistration  to  rely
on  easily  collected  taxes. The  general  requirements  for  effective
administration  can  be specified  in  more  detail  as follows:
1.  Taxpayer  attitudes  l/
Modern  taxation  depends  heavily  on  voluntary  cooperation  by tax-
payers. Self-assessed  income  taxes  are  a case  in point,  but  not  the
only  one.  Governments  in  LDCs meet  with  special  problems  in fostering
a  spirit  of  taxpayer  cooperation,  inasmuch  as  taxes  are  not  generally
linked  to  a rising  level  of government  services. Taxpayer  education
should  include  information  for  the  taxpayer  on  his  obligations  under  the
1/  Sections  1-4  rely  heavily  on  Muten,  Leif,  'Leading  Issues  of Tax
Policy  in Developing  Countries: the  Administrative  Problems,"  in the
Political  Economy  of  Taxation,  edited  by Peacock  and  Forte,  (Oxford,
1981).- 9  -
tax  law. Behind  education,  however,  must lie  the  threat  of sanctions  if
taxes  are  not  paid.  In  most  LDC's  sanctions  on negligent  or fraudulent
taxpayers  are  not  effectively  applied.
A  taxpayer  will  be  more  receptive  to information  on his  obligations
if,  in  his  efforts  to  comply,  he receives  a  reasonable  degree  of service
from  the  re->nue  administration.  Poorly  drafted  tax  forms,  long  waiting
lines  and  eren  charges  for  acquiring  tax  forms,  bureaucratic  hassle  in
processing  the  Lases,  rudeness  from  officials,  cumbersome  Lppeals  pro-
cedures,  and the  like,  can  repel  even  the  most loyal  taxpayer.
Tax  authorities  inform  taxpayers  by deeds  as  well  as words.
A taxpayer  will  care little  about  even  the  most inviting  call  for
voluntary  cooperation  If  he finds  the  authorlties  reluctant  to  respect
his  rights. Also,  while  it  is  easy to  understand  why precarious  govern-
ment finances  and understaffed  tax  offices  make for  slow  refunds,  delays
in  refunds  foster  reluctant  taxpayers. If  refunds  are slow  or inef-
ficiently  administered,  great  caution  should  be exercised  in  adopting
tax  schemes  that  include  refunds,  such  as investment  grants,  employment
subsidies,  rebates  of  VAT  on inputs  to  export  industries,  and  year-end
PAYE  adjustments.  The  malfunctioning  of such  rules  not  only  makes  them
ineffective  but  may  well lead  to  a lower  l-vel  of taxpayer  compliance
than  would  prevail  without  them.
Similarly  counterproductive  are  excessive  tax  rates  never  applied
in  practice. It  can  be  argued  that  announcing  such  rates  in the  statute
should  satisfy  claims  for  redistribution  raised  among  those  in  lower- 10  -
income  brackets. However,  those  who  ask for  redistribution  are  often
unaware  of the  high rates,  whereas  those  affected  may  be all  too  aware
of the  inefficient  usc  ade  of them. Taxpayers  faced  with  excessive
rates  may  feel  forced  to  evade  or avoid  the  tax. The  educational  value
of realism  in tax  law  can  be considerable.
Information  provided  by press,  radio,  and  television,  has  to  be
intelligible  to taxpayers. Whatever  the  form  of that  language,  the
information  to the  taxpayers  will  normally  have  to be  given  In  a  simpler
form.  Conceivably,  the  administration's  efforts  in  educating  taxpayers
should  bring  sous  feedback  In  the  form  of more  realistic  tax  legisla-
tion.  Statutory  provisions  Imposing  obllgations  on  the  taxpayer  that
he  cannot  understand,  or  giving  him  rights  that  he  cannot  effectively
use,  are  of little  value  and  should  be remodeled  into  rules  adapted  to
social  realities.
2.  Staff  resources
So far  we have discussed  obstacles  to  better  administration  In
terms  of taxpayer  compliance.  The  other  side  of the  coin  Is the  ability
of the  administration  itself  to  apply  tax  laws. In this  respect  tax
admlnistration  resources  vary  widely,  from  a  very  low  level  in  the
poorest  developing  countries  to  much  more sophisticated  staffs  in  higher
lncome  developing  countries. One  basic  problem  is  the  shortage  of
trained  officials,  particularly  those  able  to  handle  such  tasks  as
auditing  company  and  personal  accounts  or  designing  and  operating- 11  -
computer  applications  for  tax  administration.  Another  Is the  lack
of data  that  wou.d  enable  administrators  to Identify  assessment  and
collection  problems  more easily.
3.  Legal  problems  of tax  administration
The  drafting  of tax  laws  in  LDCs  sometimes  meets  with  a peculiar
problem;  namely,  the  lack  of harmony  that  oftea  exists  between  the
actual  performance  standards  of the  tax  administration  on the  one  hand,
and  the  standards  required  by the  judiciary  on the  other.
The  tax  law  may  be  sketchy,  the  tax  administration  weak,  and the
practical  difficulties  in Imposing  the  tax  law  on an  uncooperative
public  overwhelming.  If  in these  circumstances  the  courts  apply
unrealistically  high  stendards,  there  is  a real  risk  that  their  activity
will be seen  as intolerable  sabotage. Just  to take  one  example  as
illustration:  where  spelling  habits  or transcriptions  of  names  are
arbitrary,  a court  throwing  out  an assessmen;  on the  ground  that  the
taxpayer's  name  is  being  misspelled  may  open  the  door for  easy
evasion. Here,  there  is often  a need for  the  courts  to  modify  their
standards  to  a realistic  level. If  they  do  not, their  power  to deal
with tax  appeals  may  te taken  away from  them,  and the  rule  of law  will
register  a more  serious  violation  than  that  which  might  have  obtained
had standards  been  adjusted.
Another  situation  might  be  one  in which  judicial  review  of tax
cases  is  not  provided  for  under  the  law,  or if provided  for  is never-
theless  not  effectively  available. The  latter  may  be the  case,  for- 12 -
instance,  when  court  backlogs  exist. Without  legal  appeal,  one  might
expect  taxpayers  to  be in  an unfavorable  position  vis-a-vis  the
authorities. In  actual  fact,  however,  the  tax  authority  might  hesitate
to  apply  what  it  conceives  to  be an  extreme  interpretation  of the  law,
lf there  is  no  effective  legal  appeal. In such  situations  there  will
also  be a tendency  to  make  a deal  with  the  taxpayer  to avoid  the
embarrassment  of an appeals  procedure  that  gets  nowhere. Thus,
introducing  an  effective  appeals  procedure  might  not  only serve  the
rights  of taxpayers;  it  might  reduce  the  timidity  of the  tax  authority
as  well.
4.  Corruption
In too  many  countries  the  main problem  is less  the  shortcouings  of
the  statute  than  the  means  taxpayers  find  to  evade  it.  Probably  no tax
system  is totally  free  from  corrupt  practices. It is  only fair  to say,
however,  that  conditions  in many  developing  countries  tend  to  make  such
practices  -ore  prevalent. Corrupt  practices  can  be seen  as leakages,  or
inefficiencies  in the  tax  systems. In  this  light,  there  are  obviously
great  differences  between  small  sums  paid  to  speed  up a procedure  or to
keep  goodwill,  and  substantial  amounts  extorted  from  taxpayers  or
offered  by them  in  lieu  of the  tax  they  are  liable  to  pay.
What  can  be  done to  counteract  corruption?  Nobody  has  come  up  with
a panacea. Anti-corruption  task  forces  often  only  skin  the  surface.- 13 -
Experiments  aimed  at establishing  a new  spirit  In the  tax  administra-
tion  by  substantial  salary  increases  have  not  been uniformly  success-
ful. A  more subtle  anti-corruption  effect  may  be achieved  by improved
staff  training. The  objective  is the  same  as that  of higher  salaries;
namely,  to  establish  a better  esprit  de corps,  thus  reducing  the
inclination  of officials  to  resort  to  bargaining  for  their  own  profit.
Tax legislation  can  be revised  so  as to reduce  as  much  as possible
the  number  of discretionary  measures,  since  these  particularly  lend
themselves  to  corrupt  practices.  Applying  automatic  rules,  rather  than
leaving  room for  estimates  by tax  officials,  may  render  the  system  less
flexible  and to  an extent  less  fair  than  It  would  ideally  be.  However,
automatic  or standard  estimates  may  well  be preferable  to  discretionary
measures  which  can lend  themselves  to  bargaining  between  tax  officials
and taxpayers.- 14  -
IV.  Some Solutions  to  Tax  Administration  Problems  in  LDC's
1.  Withholding
Despite  the  formidable  problems  of  tax  environment  and  the  specific
problems  mentioned  above,  administrators  in  developing  countries  do  have
weapons  at their  disposal,  some  of them  enhanced  by  modern  technology.
Probably  the  single  most  effective  method  of tax  collection  In indus-
trial  as  vell  as  developing countries is withholding, I.e., the idea
that  tax  Is  withheld  and  turned  over  to the  Governmaet  before  it  reaches
the  hands  of the  taxpayer.
Withholding  is  most  commonly  applied  to  wage income,  but  it is  also
applied  in some  countries,  such  as Argentina,  Senegal  and  Taiwan,  to
Interest  and  dividends. An effective  withholding  scheme,  however,
requires  a relatively  small  number  of easily  identifiable  payers
ofincome. Withholding  may  thus  be  applied  to  wages,  dividends  and
interest,  but  it in difficult  to  apply  to rental  income,  income  of
professionals  and  income  from  small  businesses.  In  these  latter  cases
there  are  as  many  payers  as  receivers  of  such  income.
Three  systems  of  withholding  may  be distinguished.  The  U.S.  system
is  not  intended  to  withhold  the  precise  amount  of  income  tax  liability
due,  although  some  effort  is  being  made in  that  direction  following  the- 15  -
Tax  Reform  Act  of 1986. Withholding  tables  are  originally  based  on  a
flat  rate  of tax  and  basic  personal  exemptions  and  allowances.  A  few
days  after  each  pay  period  the  employer  pays to the  government  the
amount  withheld. At the  end  of the  year,  the  employer  Sives  the
employee  a statement  of the  total  amount  of wages  or salary  earned
during  the  jear  and  the  amount  of tax  withheld. The  employee  is
required  to file  a tax  return,  which  indicates  whether  the  amount
withheld  is  more,  less,  or equal  to the  amount  actually  du-.  In  most
cases,  tax  is  over-withheld  and  a refund  is  made  after  the  return  Is
filed. In  contrast  to the  U.S.  systa of returns  filed  by the
indivldual,  the  U.K.  system  places  the  burden  of payment  on the
employer. The  U.K.  system  is intended  to  withhold  the  exact  amount
of tax  liability  in  most  cases. Each  employee  is required  to file
information  about  his  dependents,  anticipated  deductions  and  other
income  with the  tax  administration  at the  beginning  of the  year.
The  administration  assigns  him  a code  number  which  is  used  by his
employer  to  determine  for  each  pay  period  the  proper  amount  of tax  to be
withheld,  taking  into  account  accumulated  payments  already  made  during
the  year.  However,  delays  in  adjudicating  the  employee  statements  often
cause  inaccurate  withholdlig.  A  third  type  of withholding  is that
employed  by some  LDCs,  e.g.,  Chile  and  Indonesia,  in  which  the  amount
withheld  is simply  declared  to  be final. This  method  sacrifices  equity
goals,  but  works  well  when  most  income  is  in the  form  of  wages.- lb  -
The  ideal  system  is  one  which  vwthholls  an  amount  precisely  equal
to  the  taxpayer's  ultimate  tax  liabilitly.  The  tax  authority  would  then
be spared  the  cost  of processing  final  returns. Under  such  a system,
the  cost  of collecting  small  amounts  from  many  taxpayers,  the  necessity
for  refunds,  and  the  losses  from  uncollectible  accounts  would  be  elisi-
nated. Also,  the  taxpayer  would  hive  the  convenience  of not filing  a
final  tax  return. But  such  a 'fine  tuning'  for  all  taxpayers  can  be
achieved  only  by provisions  which  are  difficult  to  administer,  and  may
place  a considerable  burden  of compliance  on employers. On the  other
hand,  a withholding  system  with  a flat  rate  is  such  easier  to  apply.
The  system  mya  function  satisfactorily  if  most  wage  earners  have a
steady  income  which  Is  not  above  the  lowest  bracket  to  which  the
standard  rate  is  applied.
2.  Emphasis  on indirect  taxes
Many developing  countries  have  realized  that  direct  taxes--
especially  the  personal  income  tax--are  relatively  difficult  and  expen-
sive  to  administer.  Rather  than  attempt  to  enforce  a global  income  tax,
for  example,  developing  countries  have  turned  to  taxes  based  on sales.
Of  these  taxes  the  value-added  tax  is  considered  economically  desirable
because  it  can  be  broad-basad  and  neutral  with  respect  to  the  allocation
of resources.  The  standard  consumption  type  VAT  has  the  further  advan-
tage  that  it  taxes  consumption  rather  than  savings.  The  VAT  uses  the- 17 -
principle  of withholding,  and  in fact  has  been  characterized  as  a 'form
of withholding"  intended  to implement  a retail  (or  other)  sales  tax  more
efficiently. Under  the  commonly  used invoice  system  of administering
the  value-added  tax,  a taxpayer  at any  stage  in the  production  process
credits  his  tax  paid  on the  prior  stage  against  his  own  collections  of
VAT.  The  difference  i. paid  to  Government. In  theory  each  taxpayer
should  have i  strong  interest  in  proving  that  VAT  has  been  paid  at
the  prior  stage--hence  the  self-checking  nature  of the  tax. Although
economists  have  been  intrigued  with  this  self-checking  mechanism,  the
tax  in  practice  is  far  from  self-enforcing;  evasion  occurs  because  at
the  retail  stage  the  tax  Is  not  self-checking.  In  addition,  taxpayers
have  a coson  interest  In  avoiding  the  tax  altogether,  and  legal
exemptions  open up channels  of evasion.
Row  can  a VAT  be administered  successfully  in  developing
countries?  1/  An  important  requirement  for  successful  VAT
administration  is  to  structure  the  tax  to  minimize  problems  of
implementation.  From  the  administrative  point  of  view  a single  rate
is  highly  desirable;  if  necessary,  the  VAT  can  be  supplemented  with
selective  consumption  taxes  to reduce  regressivity.  Despite  Initial
skepticism  about  high  VAT  rates,  experience  (e.g.,  in  Brazil  and  Chile)
has shown  that  rates  in the  neighborhood  of  18 to  20 percent  can  be
enforced. Exemptions  complicate  VAT  administration  because  the  dis-
tinction  between  what  is  exempt  and  what is  taxed  is  often  tenuous  or
1/  See  Casanegra  de  Jantscher,  Milka,  'Problems  of Administering  a
Value-Added  Tax In Developing  Countries,"  International  Monetary  Fund,
VP/86/15.- 18  -
arbitrary. Nevertheless,  distributional  objectives  have led  many
countries  to exempt  basic  and  nonbasic  commodities.  Zero-rating,
a more  complex  form  of exemption  that  requires  the  granting  of refunds
and  therefore  burdens  the  administration,  has  wisely  been  limited  to
exports  by most  countries.  The need  to  provide  special  treatment  for
small  business  under  VAT  is  much more  pressing  In developing  than  in
Industrial  countries.  Various  methods  for  dealing  with small  taxpayers
are  in  use,  but  ali  methods  present  technical  and  practical  problems.
Successful  introduction  of a  VAT  depends  in large  measure  on
whether  the  country  has  had  previous  experience  with  general  sales
taxes,  the  nature  of the  taxes  that  the  VAT  will replace,  the  lead-in
tine,  and  how  the  VAT  is  structured  in  terms  of  rates,  exemptions,  and
treatment  of small  taxpayers.  The  main issues  of  VAT  administration
concern  Identifying  taxpayers,  processing  returns,  controlling  col-
lections,  making  refunds,  auditing  taxpayers,  and  levying  penalties.
Once  a VAT  is in place,  admini;trative  constraints  tend to  distort  some
of Its  features. Administrations  with Insufficient  resources  frequently
over-emphasize  enforcement  efforts  among  large  taxpayers,  and  restrict-
ive  refund  practices  tend  to  distort  the  character  of consumption-type
VATs.  Thus  the  broad-based  and  neutral  tax  discussed  in  public  finance
treatises  is  very  different  from  the  VAT prevailing  in most  developing
countries.  Administrative  constraints  are  responsible  for  the
difference.- 19  -
3.  Self-enforcing  adiinistrative  methods  ard  cross-checking  devices
One suggested  method  of reducing  tax  administration  difficulties  is
self-enforcing  methods  that  will  encourage  taxpayers  to report  Incomes
and  expenditures.  1/  Kaldor,  in  his  well-known  report  on India,  was
perhaps  the  first  economist  to  suggest  linking  taxes  together  to force
greater  compliance.  Kaldor  suggested  that  five  taxes--the  income  tax,
the  capital  gains  tax,  the  wealth  tax,  the  personal  expenditure  tax,  and
the  gift  tax--be  filed  in  a single  comprehensive  return  and  assessed
simultaneously.  The taxes  are self-checking--that  Is,  concealment  or
understatement  of items  in  order  to reduce  liability  in a  particular  tax
would  increase  liability  in other  taxes;  and  information  furnished  by  a
taxpayer  in  order  to prevent  over-assessment  of his  own liabilities
automatically  reveals  the  receipts  and  gains  made  by other  taxpayers.
Riggins  has  carried  Kaldor's  idea  further  by introducing  a self-
enforcing  tax  system  for  developing  countries. Riggins'  system  includes
a personal  income  tax  (including  capital  gains),  a corporation  income
tax,  a general  sales  or turnover  tax,  a wealth  tax,  a tax  on excess
inventory,  and  a personal  expenditure  tax. Theoretically,  the  Kaldor-
Higgins  system  is self-checking  because  personal  expenditure  Is defined
as the  excess  of income  over  savings,  and  savings  are  equal  to the
increase  in  net  wealth. Thus,  taxpayers  who  under-report  their
expenditure  by overstating  their  savings  increase  their  wealth  tax
1/  See  Mansfield,  op cit.- 20 -
liability. A seller  of a property  who  understates  his capital  gains
hurts  the  buyer,  because  the  buyer  cannot  claim  the  full  amount  of the
investment,  thereby  forcing  him  to  declare  higher  expenditures  and
increasing  his  expenditure  tax  liability.  The  excess  inventory  tax  is
designed  to discourage  under-reporting  of sales,  thus  helping  enforce
sales  and income  tax.
The  more  grandiose  self-enforcing  schemes  suggested  by economists
have  generally  received  short  shrift  from  tax  administrators.  Goode,
in  writing  on economic  aspects  of tax  administration,  comments: these
proposals  appear  so unrealistic  that  a detailed  critique  is  not  worth-
while. In  my opinion  their  authors  exaggerated  the  proclivity  of tax-
payers  to refined  calculations,  the  capacity  of tax  departments  for
using  the  great  mass  of data  that  would  be generated,  and the  receptlv-
ity  of governments  to fiscal  innovations.  I  suspect  that  most tax
administrators  will regard  the  Idea  of a self-enforcing  tax  system  as
fantastical.  Even  if put  into  operatlon  the  proposed  systems  would  not
prevent  evasion  in  cases  in  which  both  parties  to  a transaction  omit it
from  their  records  or understate  its  amoonc.  Both  parties  could  evade
the  related  taxes,  and  as no conflict  of interest  would  arise  between
them,  neither  vould  have  an economic  incentive  to  report  correctly."  1/
Despite  the  justified  criticism  of elaborate  self-enforcing
schemes,  tax  administrators  may  corn to see  a grain  of truth  in  the
logic  of  such  schemes,  and  one  suspects  they  should  not  be  dismissed
1/  See  Goode,  Richard,  Government  Finance  in  Developing  Countries,
Brookings  Institution  (Washington,  D.C.,  1984).- 21  -
entirely.  In  many developing as well  as industrial  countries, import
duties  and  taxes  on domestic  transactions  are tvpically  administered  by
separate  departments,  with little  or no  contact  or  exchange  of infor-
mation  among  them. In some  countries  sales  and income  taxes  are  also
administered  by separate  departments,  and  outside  experts  usually
recommend  the  exchange  of information  between  these  revenue  depart-
ments. Such  an exchange  is  highly  advisable  because  gross  sales  are
an element  of income  tax  determination,  and  the  exchange  of information
forces  consistency  In tax  reporting. As computer  systems  allow  great
quantities  of data  to  be stored  and  used,  the  idea  of self-enforcing
taxes  based  on  matching  of  iformation  from  different  sources  becomes
more  possible. In  developing  countries  the  scope  for  self-checking
taxes  will  be limited,  however,  by the  fact  that  so  much economic
activity  stems  from  the  self-employed.
4.  Computerization 1/
Over  the  past  decade  computer  technology  has  become  an integral
part  of tax  administration  operations  in  many  developing  countries.
This  technology  has  an obvious  capacity  to perform  more  rapidly  such
routine  tasks  as processing  forms,  compiling  statistics  and  using
available  data  more  effectively  to improve  forecasting  of fiscal
revenues. Furthermore,  revenue  administrators  in  developing  countries
face  expanding  workloads: the  number  of taxpayers  has  grown  rapidly,
1/  See  Corfoat,  Franjois,  'Computerizing  Revenue  Administrations  In
LDCs,"  Finance  and  Development,  (September  1983).- 22  -
procedures  and  regulations  have  become  more complex,  international  trade
has  increased  and  greater  quantities  of data for  economic  and  fiscal
policy  making  are  necessary. In  theory,  computer  technology  could  play
a large  part  in solving  these  challenges. Rowever,  a cAreful  distinct-
ion  should  be made  between  the  ability  of computer  technology  to  perform
routine  tasks  more  rapidly  and its  ability  to  actually  increase  revenue
collections.  After  an initial  period  of over-optimism  In the  1960s-70s
it  has  become  clear  that  computer  technology  is  not  a panacea  for
revenue  administrations.  In the  first  place  the  improved  technology
must  be effectively  used for  routine  tasks. More importantly,  computer
technology  must  be combined  with  political  will  and  effective  organ-
ization  If it is to  yield  its  potential  for  greater  revenue. Technology
without  accompanying  enforcement  procedures,  for  example,  will  not  help
in  increasing  revenues.
a.  Master  files
Given  these  caveats,  how  can  computer  technology  help  improve
tax  administration?  A central  idea  is  the  development  of  a master
file  system.  The  system  assigns  a  unique  number  to  each  taxpayer.
This  unique  number  directly  aids  in  identifying,  assessing  and  col-
lecting  direct  taxes,  such  as  the  personal  lncome  tax,  the  corporate
income  tax  and  the  property  tax.  In  addition,  information  relating  to
the  taxpayer,  such  as value  of Imports  or gross  sales,  can  be stored
together  with  his  unique  number. In this  way  the  master  file  can- 23 -
become  an Important  instrument  for  audlt.  If  the  taxpayer  identi-
fication  number  is  tied  to  other  means  of identification,  such  as a
social  security  card,  a driver's  license  or a passport,  it  also  can  be
a potentially  powerful  means  of tax  enforcement.  As noted  above,  the
master  file  number  is  a potentially  powerful  aid  to tax  administration,
but  Is  must  be  combined  with  political  will  and  human  organization  to
be effective.
b.  Application  to  customs
Cooputer  technology  can  aid  in  customs  administration  to identify
importers,  clear  goods,  manage  tariff  files,  control  inventories  and
complle  external  trade  statistics.  These  functions  are usually  divided
into  two  categories:  central  processing  and customs  office  functlons.
At the  central  processing  site,  maintenance  and  compilation  of the
"Integrated  tariff,"  and  data  centralization  and !nformation  services
are  the  main  functions.  Automated  ciearance  requires  the  creation  of
a  set  of files  (the  integrated  tariff)  that  would  contain,  for  each
customs  tariff  heading,  all  the  data  needed  to  verify  that  goods  meet
requirements  (quotas,  licenses,  health  regulations,  etc.)  and to
calculate  duties  and taxes  payable. The  data  centralization  and
informotion  services  of computer  system are designed  to produce
external  trade  statistics,  analyses  of  Import  and  export  prices,  and
insurance  and  freight  studles.  Useful  information,  such  as  general- 24-
accounting  estimation  of cost  of duty-free  and  privileged  clearances,
fraud  analyses  and changes  in workloads  can  also  be generated  for
customs  management.
In customs  offices,  automated  clearance  of imported  and  exported
goods  is the  main  application  of  computer  systems. Principal  operations
Include  entering,  checking  and storing  data;  printing  out  of declarations;
applications  of regulations  on external  trade  (e.g.,  licenses,  quotas,
prohibitions,  and  health  controls);  calculation  of duties  and  other
levies;  and identifying  where  document  checks  and  physical  examination
of goods  might  be needed. These  are  normally  processed  instantaneousli.
Less  time-sensitive  managesent  tasks  are  often  handled  through  batch
processing.  This  method  allows  a  computer  to  collect  data  and  process
It  at  a later  date  and  can  be used to  maintain  official  records,  produce
daily  periodic  accounting  statements  and  compile  official  activity
reports  and  tables.
c.  Application  to  Internal  tax  administration
Tax collection  procedures  vary from  country  to  country,  but
computer  systems  have  commonly  been  used to  process  returns  and
payments,  assist  In  enforcement  operations  and  compile  statistics.
In  processing  tax  returns  and  payments,  computers  can  pre-address
forms  and  payment  vouchers,  check  the  accuracy  and  consistency  of
data  reported,  calculate  taxes,  identify  computation  errors,  maintain
taxpayers'  records  and  prepare  refund,  assessment,  and penalty  notices.- 25
Mathematical  formulas  and statistical  programs  can  be developed  to
select  returns  for  audit,  and verify  data  and identify  tax  evaders
through  cross-checking  with  external  sources  or other  computer  files.
At  minimal  cost,  computer  programs  can  also  produce  opeTating  and
statistical  reports  designed  to  assist  tax  managers  and  policy  makers
in  management  and planning,  formulation  of tax  policy  and  economic
analysis  and  research.
An important  function  in tax  administration  is the  selection  of
returns  for  audit  so  that  limited  resources  are focused  on particular
areas  to  maximize  gains  in revenue  and  elicit  compliance. In identi-
fying  likely  candidates  for  auditing,  computer  programs  use  selection
criteria  and  classification  techniques  to  assign  weights  to  various
characteristics  involving  the  high  probability  of error,  change  and
evasion. The  formulas  used  in this  process  are  kept secret  not  only
to  avoid  manipulation  of returns  by taxpayers  but  also to  ensure
Impartiality  in the  selection  of returns.
d.  Introduction  of computers  in  developing  countries
Developing  countries  introducing  computer  systems  for  revenue
administration  face  a number  of important  decisions  regarding  design
and implementation.  One  concerns  the  structure  of the  computer  system;
satisfactory  results  have  been produced  both  by those  systems  servicing
solely  the  Tax  Department  from  within,  and  those  systems  located  outside
the  Department  and  perhaps  servicing  several  other  entities  as well.-26-
In an external  system  the  design,  development  and  operation  are  provided
by  an organization  that  is independent  of the  tax  collecting  departments
and that  may  be responsible  for  providing  all publi.  entities  with the
information  needed  for  their  operations  and  decisions. Such  are the
systems  used  in  Brazil,  El Salvador,  and  most  of the  nations  of
francophone  Africa. In  an approach  using  Internal  systems  the  Finance
Ministry  may  require  operating  departments  each to  be responsible  for
the  supervision  and  control  of their  own  computer  systems. The  U.S.
Internal  Revenue  Service,  for  example,  organizes  its  operations  in this
manner,  as do most  of the  tax  departments  of the  member  countries  of
the Inter-American  Center  of Tax  Administrators.
While  the  Initial  choice  may  depend  upon  several  factors,  including
the  scale  of  operations  to  be performed,  capital  expenditures,  and
efficient  utilization  of computer  hardware,  one  major  consideration  is
the  availability  of adequate  numbers  of skilled  computer  technicians.
Because  computer  costs  are falling  and the  number  of available  tech-
nicians  is increasing,  and  because  services  provided  by the  central
computer  organization  might  prove  unresponsive  in terms  of either
seasonal  fluctuations  of work  or unplanned  events  (tax  legislation
changes,  for  example),  a mixed  approach  may  be preferable and  is often
applied. Under  such  a scheme  the  central  computer  of the  Ministry  of
Finance  usually  provides  services  for  policy  activities  and for  the
ministry's  own  statistical  and national  reporting  needs  and  may,  when- 27  -
necessary,  provide  services  on a time-sharing  basis  for  some  collection
work  of the  revenue  departments.  On the  other  hand,  the  data  processing
units  of the  revenue  departments  operate  their  own  computer  systems  and
perform  time-sensitive  activities,  such  as issuing  custams  clearances,
tax  refund  checks,  assessment  notices,  tax  receipts,  and  answering
inquiries.
e.  Conclusion
In  conclusion,  there  clearly  are potential  advantages  to properly
applied  systems  of data  processing. In  customs  work the  growing  volume
of international  trade,  new  methods  of transport,  increasingly  complex
regulations,  and  expanded  information  requirements  may make  automation  a
necessity  If  developing  countries  wish to  prevent  undue  delays  at their
borders  and  to  increase,  or  even  just  maintain,  their  share  of world
trade. In  administration  of internal  taxes,  increased  compliance  with
tax  obligations  and  more  efficient  collection  are  becoming  priorities
for  developing  countries. Automation  may  eventually  offer  the  most
effective neans  of meeting  these  needs.
Our initial  note  of caution  should  remain,  however. For  many
reasons,  both  administrative  and  political,  the Lntroduction  of  computer
systems  may  not  achieve  the  intended  result. Many of the  difficulties
associated  with  automation,  however,  can  be  avoided  or  minimized  with
appropriate  planning  and  a  careful  assessment  of  current  needs  and
specific  goals.  The  experience  of  many  Industrial  and  a growing  number- 28  -
of developing  countries,  as well  as the  availability  of technical
assistance,  can  help  a country  make  the  transition  from  manual  to
computerized  systems  a successful  one.
5.  Presumptive  Taxation  1/
Presumptive  taxation  refers  to the  use  of simple  methods  of
assessing  complicated  taxes,  or in  some  cases  the  replacement  of more
sophisticated  tax  legislation  vith simpler  rules. Presumptive  taxes  my
be  used in  the field  of personal  and  corporate  income  taxes,  as well  as
property  and land taxes. In  the  case  of income  taxes,  public  finance
xperts  tend  to think  of individual  and  company  income  tax  as being
imposed  on a  well-defined  and  accurate  measure  of recorded  income  over  a
given  period,  normally  a year.  In  fact,  income  tax  assessment  for  large
numbers  of taxpayers  in both  industrial  and  developing  countries  is
"presumptive'--that  is,  It  is legally  defined  on the  basis  of  appro-
priate  indicators. In  most  cases  presumptive  methods  are used  as
a simple  administrative  expedient,  but  they  can  also  be used  for
efficiency  and equity  goals.
Presumptions  are  used  to  assess  taxpayers  In  both  developed  and
developing  countries,  but  especially  In  the  latter,  where Ohard-to-taxs
taxpayers  comprise  a  large  fraction  of  the  taxpaying  population  and
adminlstrative  resources  are  generally  scarce.  One developed  country
that  has  a well-established  system  of income  presumption  is  France,
1/  This  section  relies  heavily  on Casanegra  de  Jantscher,  Nilka,  and
Tanzi,  Vito,  "The  Use  of Presumptive  Income  in  Modern  Tax  Systems,"
publication  forthcoming.- 29  -
where the  forfait  system  is used  widely. The forfait  system  establishes
alternative  legal  bases  of assessment,  using  indicators  to  determine
estimated  income  rather  than  assessments  that  are  supposed  to  be  based
on conventional  records. Forfaits  are  used to  assess  the  income  tax  of
farmers,  unincorporated  business  enterprises  and  professional  persons
whose  gross  receipts  fall  below  stipulated  levels. The  process  of
establishing  a presumptive  income  zay involve  negotiation  between
thetaxpayer  and  tax  officials. Apart  from  the  special  use of the
forfait,  where  the  presumptive  basis  is  established  In the  legislation
itself,  standard  assessments  based  on gross  receipts,  assets  or visible
wealth  are  employed  as administrative  devices.
The  degree  of  economic  development  of  a  country  tends  to  influence
the  choice  of  methods  for  estimating  incomes  and the  way they  are  ap-
plied.  Countries  in  the  earlier  stages  of development  tend  to  apply
rough  and  ready  methods  because  they  have  few  personnel  qualified  to
study  the  profitability  of  different  economic  activities  and  establish
the indices  required  for  calculating  presumptive  incomes. In those
countries  in  which  sectoral  studies  have  been  made  and  appropriate
indices  have  been  established,  it  is possible  to estlmate  Incomes  with  a
much  higher  degree  of accuracy. A perusal  of the  legal  provisions  that
establish  presumptions  of income  does  not,  in general,  disclose  to what
extent  a particular  country  is  applying  the  presumptions  established  in
the  law  nor  how they  are  applied. The  answers  will  depend  on the- 30  -
country's  circumstances  and particularly  on the  aveilability  of the
administrative  resources  needed  to  cope  with  the  complexities  of  certain
presumptive  methods.
One  of the  criteria  for  classifying  presumptions  of income  Is
whether  or not they  are  applied  generally  for  assessing  taxpayers'
income. Some  methods  for  estimating  income  are  regularly  applied  to
entire  sectors  of taxpayers  as a substitute  for  actual  incomes  based  on
accounts. Other  presumptions  of income  apply  only  when taxpayers  omit
to  file  an income  tax  return,  or their  return  is  audited. The  forfait
method  and the  standard  assessment  methods  used  In  a  number  of countries
are  examples  of presumptive  methods  that  are  applied  In  a wide  variety
of circumstances.  Presumptions  of income  that  apply  only  when taxpayers
do  not  submit  a return  or when  they  are  audited  include ethods  ranging
from the  use  of specific  factors  and  indices  of profitability  determined
for  different  activities  to  crude  presumptions  based  on  a single  factor,
such  as the  total  assets  of the  taxpayer.
A variety  of economic  bases  and  methods  of calculation  are  used
to provide  presumptions  of income. For  example,  certain  presumptions
are  based  exclusively  on the  taxpayer's  net  wealth  or  on the  value  of
the  enterprise. Still  others  are  based  on  visible  signs  of wealth.
The  forfait  and the  standard  assessment  methods  use  several  key  factors
and  indices  of profitability,  which  vary  by  activity,  to determine  the
taxpayer's  income.- 31 -
A  presumptive  tax  that  is used  In lieu  of the  corporate  tax  on  net
profits  Is  a tax  on gross  receipts. Such  a  tax  avoids  the  difficulties
of measuring  such  sophisticated  concepts  as depreciation  in  calculating
net  profit. This tax  has  been found  to be effective  in.  terms  of  revenue
yield  and  ease  of administration.  Francophone  African  countries  have
been  pioneers  in  the  establishment  of minimum  corporate  income  taxes.
This tax  can  be  credited  against  the  regular  corporate  tax,  but  no
refunds  are  allowed  if the  minimum  tax  exceeds  the  corporate  tax.
The  minimum  tax  based  on gross  receipts  is equivalent  to  a simple
presumption  of income. For  example,  if the  corporate  tax  rate  ln  a
country  that  applies  this  system  is equal  to  40 percent  of  net  profits
and  the  minimum  tax  is  equal  to  1 percent  of gross  receipts,  authorities
are  acting  as if  all  corporations  earn  a  minimum  net taxable  income
equal  to 2.5  percent  of their  gross  receipts. As  an example  outside
Africa,  in 1983  Colombia  established  a general  presumption  of net  income
based  on  gross  receipts,  applicable  to  all  taxpayers,  individual  and
corporate,  except  those  whose  main sources  of income  are  wages  and
salaries. The  law  presumes  that  net income  amounts  to  at least
2  percent  of  gross  receipts.
Like  presumptions  based  on  net  wealth  or  on  owuership  of  particular
assets,  presumptions  based  on  gross  receipts  are  not  a  panacea  for  tax
administrations  attempting  to improve  taxpayer  compliance. In  most
developing  countries  concealment  of gross  receipts  is  a favored  method- 32  -
of tax  evaslon. Presumptions  of income  based  on gross  receipts  thus
maLnly  affect  taxpayers  who  cannot  easily  conceal  gross  receipts  (e.g.,
large  corporatlons).  As a result  of such  presumptions,  corporations
with  genuine  losses  are  treated  in the  same  manner  as corporations  that
artiflcially  reduce  their  profits  by such  methods  as  manipulatlng
transfer  prlces. All  corporatlons  with  the  same  turnover  pay  the  same
tax. For  smaller  enterprises  that  have  prevlously  concealed  a portlon
of their  gross  recelpts  and  continue  to  do so,  the  LntroductLon  of a
presumptLon  of net  income  based  on turnover  ls  of llttle  consequence
and  has  no material  effect  on thelr  tax  liabllity.
The  income  tax  legislation  of several  countries  includes  presump-
tions  of  income  based  on  vislble  slgns  of  wealth. These  presumptions
apply  only  to  indivlduals.  In  some  countrLes,  such  as  Brazil  and  Peru,
the  tax  department  is  empowered,  ln somewhat  general  terms,  to  presume
Lncomes  higher  than  those  reported  by  taxpayers  on  the  basls  of  visible
signs  of  wealth.  It  is  left  to  the  administration  to  decide  which  signs
of  wealth  to  use  and  what  level  of income  to  attach  to them.  In  other
countries,  Lncluding  Prance,  Italy  and  several  francophone  African
countries,  presumptlons  based  on  visible  signs  of  wealth  are  carefully
specified  in  the  income  tax  act.  The  signs  of  wealth  that  *ust  be
considered  are  described  and  each  is  assigned  an  income  equivalent.
Such  signs  of  wealth  usually  include  the  taxpayer's  main  and  secondary
residences,  number  of  domestLc  servants,  automobiles,  yachts,  private
planes  and  race  horses.- 33  -
In  practice,  presumptions  based  on visible  signs  of  wealth  have
proved  difficult  to apply. When  they  are  established  in  general  terms,
tax  administrators  are  hard pressed  to  decide  which  signs  of wealth  to
use  as  a basis  for  the  presumptlon  and  how  to  establish  the  income
equivalent  of each.  In  those  countries  in  which  both  the  signs  of
wealth  and  their  income  equivalent  have  been  specified  in  the  statute,
the  inflexibilty  of the  provisions  may  lead  to  considerable  unfair-
ness. Recognizing  these  problems,  tax  departments  tend  to  apply  these
presumptions  cautiously  and only  when  additional  assessments  cannot  be
supported  by  other  means. One  of the  areas  in  which  such  presumptions
have  proved  useful  is in supporting  assessments  on illegal  incomes,
'.ich  as those  derived  from  racketeering  and  drug trafficking.
Many  developing  countries  use  estimated  assessment  methods  for
the  incomes  of  'hard-to-tax  taxpayers.  These  taxpayers  are  mainly
individual  proprietorships,  farmers,  and  professionals.  The  forfait
method  mentioned  above  has inspired  a number  of  other  countries  to  adopt
similar  systems.  But  to successfully  implement  a forfait  system  several
requirements  must  be  met.  First,  the  tax  department  must  have  the  tech-
nical  resources  to  make  detailed  studies  of  profitability  by type  of
activlty.  Second,  an  adequate  number  of  tax  officials  must  be  available
to  verify  Information  provided  by taxpayers  about  the  characteristics  of
their  business. Third,  because  the forfait  involves  discussions  between
officials  and taxpayers  regarding  the  level  of the  assessment,  officials
must  be  strictly  supervised  and  adequately  paid. Otherwise,  the  system
creates  strong  incentives  for  corcuption.- 34  -
Not  many  tax  administrations  can  fulfill  these  requirements.
Those  countries  that  have  tried  to implement  systems  similar  to the
forfait  without  adequate  resources  have  ended  up  with  highly  flawed
systems. One  of the  principal  obstacles  has  been  the  lack  of resources
to  draw  up  detail  d sectoral  profitability  studies. Some  countrles  have
managed  to study  a half  dozen  sectors,  and  no more.  In  such  circum-
stances,  discussions  between  officials  and taxpayers  about  assessments
are  based  mainly  on subjective  impressions.  This  has  led  to  unrealistic
assessments  and to  corruption  among  tax  officials.
In  their  search  for  more  objective  systems  for  estimating  incomes,
a number  of countries  have tried  to  adapt  the  system  developed  original-
ly  in Israel  under  the  name  of tachshiv. This  system  emphasizes  the  use
of  objective  factors  and  indices  to  estimate  the  income  of taxpayers  who
do  not  keep  adequate  books  and  records. Physical  Inputs  and factors
such  as the  number  of  employees  are  highly  important  for  the  determin-
ation  of  each  enterprise's  income. If,  for  example,  the  enterprise  to
be  assessed  is  a barbershop,  the  assessment  guidelines  (tachshiv)  for
this  activity  will  contain  Instructions  for  estimating  the  enterprise's
income  according  to  the  different  kinds  of services  provided,  the
equipment  of the  establishment,  its  location,  work  schedules,  and the
visits  to  a representative  sample  of  businesses.  The  average  profit-
ability  of the  sector  and  its  relationship  to  specific  factor  and
indices  is  discussed  with  representatives  of the  sector  before  the
tachshiv  is issued. More than  80  tachshiv  have  been  developed.- 35  -
Some  aspects  of the  Israeli  experience  with  standard  assessments
have  been  criticized. Taxpayers  whose  incomes  are  above  the  averages  on
which  the  tachshiv  are  based  may  pretend  that  they  do not  have  adequate
books  and  records  to  establish  their  actual  income.  The  heavy  reliance
of  the  tachshiv  on  precise  factors  tends  to  transform  the  tax  on  income
into  a  tax  on  the  factors  set  out  in  each  tachshiv. Taxpayers  are,
therefore,  motivated  to  alter  these  factors  in their  business
establishments  in order  to  obtain  a lower  assessment.
In spite  of these  defects,  the  Israeli  system  has  been imitated  by
other  countries. Korea,  for  example,  has  Introduced  a stan4ard  assess-
ment  along  the  lines  of the  tachshiv. Other  developing  countries  have
made  efforts  in this  direction,  but  few  have  made  much  headway.
Faced  with the  task  of estimating  the  income  of "hard-to-tax"
taxpayers,  some  developing  countries  have  devised  simple  solutions
that  in  practice  depart  radically  from  the  precepts  of income  tax-
ation. For  example,  Ghana  developed  a standard  assessment  system  in
the  early  1960s  that  resulted  in  fixed  lump-sum  payments  for  different
activities.  These  payments  were  established  by determining  the  average
taxable  income  of a  few  taxpayers  selected  at random  from  each  class  of
self-employed  taxpayers. Although  the  lump-sum  payments  were  estab-
lished  as  a  minimum  income  tax,  in  practice  most  taxpayers  subject
to  standard  assessments  paid  only  the  prescribed  lump-sum  amounts.- 36-
As regards  farmers,  a number  of countries  have  attempted  to  assess  their
income  on the  basis  of the  potential  output  of  their  land.  Profession-
als,  on the  other  hand,  are sometimes  assessed  a minimum  income  tax
based  on some  estimate  of average  potential  earnings.
Most  developing  countries  have  not solved  satisfactorily  the
problem  of  how to  estimate  the  income  of "hard-to-tax"  taxpayers.
Their  objective  is  to  devise  estimation  methods  that  will  not  divert  an
excessive  proportion  of  administrative  resources  from  more productive
work.  In  Portugal,  for  example,  35,000  enterprises  paid  profits  tax  on
actual  incomes  in 1983,  while  approximately  340,000  businesses  paid  tax
on a  presumptive  base. Yet the  35,000  enterprises  that  paid  on actual
incomes  accounted  for  three-quarters  of total  profits  tax  collections.
In these  circumstances,  tax  administration  officials  must strive  to
minimize  administrative  involvement  with  low-yield  taxpayers,  without
abandoning  efforts  to  collect  some  tax  from  a'll  enterprises.
Despite  the  difficulties  mentioned  it is  clear  that  a need  exists
in  developing  countries  for  simple  methods  to tax  the 'hard-to-tax"
groups  that  now escape  income  taxation. Presumptive  methods  by  nature
cannot  be exact,  but  my  well  be preferable  to  ad hoc  judgmental
assessments  using  unspecified  criteria.- 37 -
V.  Summary  and  Conclusions
This  paper  has  examined  the  strategy  and  tools  of tax
administration  in  develcping  countries. The  traditional  aim of tax
administration  is to  assess,  collect  and  enforce  a given  set  of
legislation.  We have  seen  that  the  task  of tax  administrators  In
developing  countries  is  not so  clear-cut.  Burdened  with legislation
that  may  not  be enforceable,  they  must  select  how  a body  of legislation
will  actually  be applied. We have  also  noted  that  emphasis  on easy-
to-administer  taxes  results  in  a flawed  tax  structure,  based  in large
part  on foreign  trade  taxes. Although  tax  administrators  cannot
change  legislation,  they  can  help implement  and/or  make  possible
changes  In legislation  that  would  improve  the  effective  tax  structure.
These  efforts  should  be  aimed  at implementing  more  broadly  based  Income
and  consumption  taxes  in  order  to  reduce  dependence  on foreign  trade
taxes. For  the  personal  income  tax  this  strategy  should  mean directing
additional  administrative  efforts  toward  income  other  than  wages  and
salaries,  and  especially  earnlngs  of the  self-employed.  For the  company
tax,  efforts  should  be made to  reach  smaller  firms  so that  such firms
are  not  subsidized  relative  to  larger,  sore  modern  establishments.
With  regard  to  consumption  taxes,  administrative  efforts  should  support
legislative  changes  to broaden  the  scope  of sales  taxes,  making  posstble- 38  -
their  application  to  services  and to  retail  establishments.  This  type
of  administrative  effort  would  help  create  a broad-based  consumption  tax
that  would  not  discriminate  between  domestic  and foreign  goods  and that
would  be r3eful  for  stabilization  purposes. In follownpg  a policy  of
using  administrative  measures  to  promote  a better  tax  structure,  con-
sideration  should  be given  to  using  less  sophisticated  taxes  that  would
still  broaden  the  tax  base.
Given  this  overall  strategy,  what  are some  more  specific  tools  and
solutions  that  can  be used to  Improve  tax  administration  in  developing
countries?  Two important  tools  that  overlap  are  the  concept  of  witha-
holding  and  the  use  of computer  technology.  Wtthholdiug  Is applied
most successfully  to  wages,  interest  and  dividends,  where the  number
of payers  of Income  is small  relative  to the  number  of receivers.
Computer  technology  makes  it  possible  to  assign  each  taxpayer  a unique
number  in  a master  file,  and thus  to  simplify  the  process  of withholding
and  enforcement.  Computer  technology  also  makes  it  possible  to  gather
related  information  on  a given  taxpayer  and to  use  cross-checking
methods  to  ensure  accuracy. Many developing  countries  have  turned  to
Indirect  taxes  such  as the  value-added  tax,  instead  of relylg heavily
on the  difficult-to-admlnister  personal  income  tax. Finally,  presump-
tive  methods  of  assessment  have  been  used to  gain  added  revenue  while
simplifying  administration.PPR  Workina  Paver  Series
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